Amnesic Syndromes
Sir Aubrey Lewis (London) The Psychopathological Aspect Many of those who made notable contributions to the psychopathology of amnesia have begun with an affirmation of the importance of memory function, using some such phrase as Janet (1898), who said at the opening of his report to the London Congress of Experimental Psychology: 'The part played by memory is of paramount importance in the functioning of the mind, and its smallest alterations have grave pathological consequences'. Such aggrandizement of memory is now out offashion: psychologists concern themselves more with applying the theory of learning and of communication to its experimental study than with observation of its disorders, and clinicians are apt to look more closely at the limbic system than at dissection of the elements of retention and recall that seem to depend on the integrity of that system.
Consequently there has come about some confusion of terms. Whereas for clinicians the consummation of the memory process is the reappearance in consciousness of a former precept, for the psychologist the reappearance in consciousness is unimportant: what is significant is decay of inhibition, transfer, retroaction and other characteristics of change in performance over a period of time; these can be as well, or better, investigated on some motor task than on verbal reports of conscious recall. The psychologist is therefore ready to study memory in animal experiments; but the psychiatrist, and I think the neurologist, would have to re-examine his concept of remembering before he could comfortably follow suit. The psychiatrist finds it particularly difficult to dismiss consciousness from his concept of memory because he usually thinks of the active process of forgetting on Freudian lines, whether he is a psychoanalyst or not; and he is furthermore reluctant to extend the concept of memory because he knows how Semon and Bleuler and other clever men came to grief when they enlarged memory till it was almost coextensive with biology or psychology. Indeed the predominant state of mind of the psychiatrist in dealing with memory and its disorders is one of hopeful caution: he does not want to trip up over engrams, or premature localization, or screen memories, or any of the other traps for the unwary which he knows about, and he is disappointed at the relatively meagre advances made in the psycho-logical study of this field during the last twenty or thirty years. But he is in no doubt of its importancehe would say, with Locke, that 'memory is an intellectual creature, is necessary in the next degree to perception. It is of so great moment, that where it is wanting, all the rest of our faculties are in great measure useless; and we, in our thoughts, reasonings, and knowledge, could not proceed beyond present objects, were it not for the assistance of our memories....
The Korsakoff Syndrome
In a consideration of amnesic syndromes the first question must be 'How many are there?' and the second 'What are their characteristics?' To this the psychiatrist has a short answer: 'There is one, and its typical features are those known by Korsakoff's namesevere defect of retention and other functions of memory, time disorder, disorientation and confabulation, without any corresponding impairment of consciousness or intellectual deterioration' (Korsakoff 1890) . This, according to common usage, is the amnesic syndrome. There are, of course, disturbances of memory, sometimes startling and total, in other conditions, but the amnesia in them is not so central and conspicuous, and it does not so regularly concur with other psychological features as to constitute a clinical pattern deserving to be known as an amnesic syndrome. It may be urged that hysterical loss of memory has a strong claim to be so termed, but the manifestations of this condition are too varied and dependent on accidents of circumstance to make up a syndrome. Still, since syndromes are not handed down to us from on high and are merely provisional constructs it will do no harm if hysterical and other conditions in which memory fails are called amnesic syndromes. I shall, however, describe mainly what for the last sixty years has been the amnesic syndrome par excellence.
There are two familiar points which it is well to restate before any discussion of the Korsakoff syndrome: First that it may follow an extraordinarily wide variety of forms of cerebral damage or decaygeneral paralysis, Wernicke's encephalopathy, senile dementia, cerebral trauma, anoxia from strangulation, tumour, arteriosclerosis, encephalitis, poisoning by carbon monoxide, lead and other noxae, artificially induced convulsions, epileptic states and many more diseases of the brain. Secondly, it centres on a function which has been dissected and redistributed almost out of existence. As Bartlett (1932) put it 'It is perfectly true that nobody can put a ring around memory and explain it from within itself. The dissolving power of modem research seems to have split memory into a number of variously related functions. The functions may be many and yet, acting together, they issue in a specific process demanding its own name, and its own special modes of study'. Nature of the Disturbance The commonest division of memory is into the four stagesregistration of impressions, retention, recall and recognition. The first of these, the learning phase, is that which was chiefly incriminated in the amnesic syndrome by the old masters -Wernicke, Bonhoeffer and Kraepelin. But though they regarded defect of registration as the chief, and perhaps the fundamental and essential, anomaly, they were aware of the indirect nature of their evidence: they inferred this defect because the patient had grossly inadequate immediate recall. Thus in Brodmann's investigation (1902 Brodmann's investigation ( , 1904 because the patients could not reproduce a sequence of eight or twelve nonsense syllables even after innumerable repetitions, he assumed that the repeated impressions had not been recorded fully. But he also satisfied himself, by Ebbinghaus's sparing method, that traces were lefttraces which could only have been derived from impressions made during the learning process. Similar observations were made, in careful experiments by Gregor (1909 ), Schneider (1912 ), and Koppen & Kutzinski (1910 , using words, series of pictures and incomplete sentences and figures. The choice of material to be remembered and the manner in which it is represented are of more importance than the earlier workers realized. Andre Rey (1959) has recently demonstrated that in dysmnesic patients concrete objects visually presented are recalled better than single words spoken aloud to the subjects: this difference is evident also in normal persons, but in the patients it may go so far that words are apparently not registered at all, while objects are.
A somewhat similar observation was lately made by Nyssen (1957) : he found that Korsakovians (as he pleasantly calls them), even when very severely amnesic, can acquire, recall and recognize to some extent simple figures and words with concrete meaning if given sufficient opportunity to learn them through daily presentation and copying, but that figures are more easily recognized than words.
There is now abundant reason to conclude that although in the Korsakoff syndrome the immediate reproduction of recent impressions can be very defective, their subsequent recall or recognition may give clear proof that registration did occur, at any rate partially. The disorder must therefore be investigated also in other stages of the memory function or in other functions closely connected with memory, of which the most obvious is perception. Pick (1915) and Grunthal (1924) were the first to conclude that thinking is the psychological area basically affected in this disorder and that the patient's prime difficulty lies in forming a mental set (Einstellung): his past perceptions are not available to him, he cannot relate them to a present situation. This finding was much elaborated by Burger-Prinz & Kaila (1930) in the light of their experimental studies, and has been lately explored again in the thorough Boston inquiries (Talland 1958 , Talland & Miller 1959 which showed the patients to have an inflexibility of perceptual set, a reduced capacity to shift attention, what might be called a dysdiadochokinesia of perceptual attitude. Tied, as it were, to the first object-stimulus he receives the Korsakoff patient cannot check and revise his subsequent percepts and interpret them successfully. This militates, of course, against their utilization in recall and may favour confabulation. Nevertheless, the perceptual disorder must be considered a minor and separate aspect of the amnesic syndrome: it is not sufficient explanation of the disorder of memory to postulate as its essence a disturbance of 'set', faulty perception and incapacity to grasp orientating events and relate them to one another.
Disturbance of Time
The second most striking anomaly in the Korsakoff syndrome is the disturbance of time. This invariable feature can be most readily recognized in the patient's temporal disorientation and in his jumbling of remembered events: he cannot order the succession in which they occurred. Though recognized by Korsakoff (1890) and Bonhoeffer (1904) , this characteristic did not come into its own until thirty years ago. With the little burst of philosophical and psychological studies in time-experience that took place about that time, the Korsakoff disturbance was closely looked into, notably by van der Horst (1932, 1956) and by Ehrenwald(1931) and Krauss (1930) . It was put forward as the basic disturbance. Van der Horst (1956) has maintained that the deficit is in respect of events that have once had personal meaning: whereas impersonal experience (for example, learning an algebraic formula or nonsense syllables) does not have a temporal sign attached to it and may not be demonstrably at fault when the customary psychological tests of registration and retention are applied, quite striking incapacity will be evinced in the same patient when he is questioned about the events of his personal life, la vie vJcue. Personal events cannot be recalled with normal sharpness and clarity unless they can be placed in time: but the Korsakoff patient, says van der Horst, has an impairment in his ability to place events plucked from the continuity of past experience, and all else that occurs in the Korsakoff syndrome is a secondary effect of his temporal incapacity. 'Time is the psychological category that enables us to distinguish between perceptions which are otherwise identical.' From this supposedly primary defect in temporal organization, van der Horst also ingeniously, but not quite plausibly, derived the retrograde amnesia, the reduplicative paramnesia, the confabulations and disorientation of Korsakoff patients.
The abnormality in temporal location, which van der Horst linked so closely to personal experience, has been formulated differently by other investigators such as Ehrenwald (1931), Krauss (1930) , Lidz (1942) and, recently, Mouren & Felician (1958) in France, and Whitty & Lewin (1960) in this country. They rested their conclusions partly on experimental data. A good example of such a study is in the report by Williams & Zangwill (1950) , who found that if a series of pictures had been exposed to moderately amnesic patients, the order was retained better when the consecutive exposures could be perceived as building a related sequence (e.g. the numbers 8, 9, 10) than when they consisted of disconnected items; they also noted a tendency to antedate recent events by pushing them further back into the past. They inclined to the view that disturbance of sequence-relation is a consequence of the retention-defect, and not the basic or primary disorder. Since the point at issue does not at present lend itself to decisive experimental inquiry, it is sufficient to recognize that the aspect of memoryfunction which deals with temporal order and relation is invariably disturbed in the amnesic syndrome, and that, as Bartlett (1932) pointed out, the capacity to pick out events from the series in which they occurred is probably a late acquisition, demanding 'special devices' for reconstructing schemata; these devices will be among the first to go when the neural substrate is damaged.
Confabulation
Confabulation is so picturesque a feature of the amnesic syndrome that it has received a good deal of attention, especially from the earlier writers.
They explained it, rather too readily, as a defensive effort to hide failures of recollection:
Bonhoeffer (1904) called it 'embarrassment-confabulation' (Verlegenheits-konfabulation), while admitting that the fantasies produced could take a wider scope than this interpretation would account for. We have to ask why these patients do not simply answer 'I don't remember', and why they accept their false memories as correct; also why some patients produce their confabulations spontaneously and in plenty, while others have to be prodded with suggestions and leading questions. There are clearly considerable differences between individuals in these perversions of memory, just as there are differences in normal activities of memory between one person and another.
There is in some confabulations a dream-like quality, suggesting that they may have had their origin in a preceding delirious state or in the hallucinations of nocturnal confusion, or even in actual dreams: in such patients the confabulations are less likely to be changed in response to suggestion. Long ago Wernicke pointed out that confabulations might originate thus out of a confusional state: they are not, then, strictly products of disturbed memory. Nor is confabulation a distinctively morbid activity. Bartlett (1932) showed in his classical monograph that normal remembering is not a mechanical affair of literal, exact reduplication: we do not summon and reproduce memories in the way that we repeat nonsense syllables, by rote; our memories are subjected to a constructive process in which condensation, elaboration, and invention play a leading part. Similarly in the Korsakoff state inventive fantasy plays a more important part in determining composite fabrications than does the need to compensate for defective recall. If we examine the content of the false memories we find, as Russell (1959) and Russell & Nathan (1946) pointed out, that fragments of past experiences have been dislocated from their proper temporal sequence and their context; they are mingled with perceptual data drawn from recent events or from the situation in which the patient is being examined at the moment.
Closer examination of the content of false memories suggests that much of what is remembered, and even more of what is forgotten, depends on emotional forces, such as psychoanalytic studies have elucidated (Flament 1957) . Whereas Ebbinghaus, G E Muller and other pioneers in the study of memory ignored these affective influences, Bartlett stressed them in his vigorous revolt against the depersonalized analysis of memory, based on artificial situations. The catathymic influence of feeling-tone has been well demonstrated in systematic tests of patients with the amnesic syndrome. When, for example, they have to repeat the gist of short narrative passages that have been read to them, there is appreciably less distortion of affectively neutral passages than of disagreeable ones (Hartmann 1930 , Talland & Ekdahl 1959 . In Lindberg's (1946) thoroughly investigated patient, who had a very severe and typical Korsakoff syndrome attributable to prolonged alcoholism, his amnesia was most striking and complete in matters referring to his fiancee, whose death had been a profoundly distressing event for him: in a word-association test, his reaction-time was most delayed when the stimulus word touched on the painful circumstances of their relationship. It follows from findings such as these that some at any rate of the forgotten memories may be difficult or impossible to recall, not because of damage to the neural substrate but because repressive or other emotionally determined forces hinder the appearance of the memories in consciousness. This is only to bring the amnesia of pathological states into line with normal remembering: cf. Darwin's reason for noting down adverse observations 'I had also, during many years, followed a golden rule, namely that whenever a published fact, a new observation or thought came across me, which was opposed to my general results, to make a memorandum of it without fail and at once; for I had found by experience that such facts and thoughts were far more apt to escape from the memory than favourable ones'. A catathymic explanation for some of the Korsakoff amnesia is consistent with the wellknown fact that although such a patient cannot recall or recognize something once well within his knowledge, he may be able to reproduce it under hypnosis or in other facilitating circumstances: it may appear in his confabulations, or serve to shorten materially the time required to relearn it. An emotionally shattering experience can either distort (as in confabulation) or have the effect of repressing (as in amnesia) the recall of the event as a historical occurrence, and can operate outside consciousness to exaggerate or build upon those disturbances of memory which are the direct result of damage to cerebral structures. Striking instances ofthis have been reported in the Korsakoff syndrome after a suicidal attempt at strangulation: and it is, of course, a wellknown aspect of retrograde amnesia after head injury.
Forgetting
But these catathymic influences are by no means the whole story. No one would now dispute that forgetting is an active process, not a mere passive fading with the lapse of time. There is, it is true, a curve of forgettinig in which, as Ebbinghaus showed us, a rapid fall immediately after learning is succeeded by a general flattening out as the interval is extended. But the matter is more complex than thisand certainly more complex than our clinical methods of examination allow for. Although retention declines generally in proportion to the log of time, there can be considerable differences in the rate of decline, which will depend on the initial strength of the memory trace and of the factors which annul it. The latter are what chiefly concern us in pathological disturbances of memory. The strength of trace, however, will, both in normal and in Korsakoff subjects, itself depend on the success of the initial learning or perception, on the amount of repetition, i.e. relearning, on the kind of thing learnt or perceived, and the vividness of the initial experience to be remembered. It may also be reinforced by verbal formulation on the patient's part.
Among the factors which can annul the traces of a past experience and so prevent its recall, interference from a succeeding event has had the most attention from psychologists. This retroactive inhibition is most clearly in evidence when the two events are tasks in which the subject has to learn different responses to the same, or similar, stimuli: it is a laboratory phenomenon, which may or may not occur also when the casual events of daily life succeed one another. Whether it could be accountable for the amnesia ofKorsakoff states was experimentally tested by in the elaborate studies he has made in Professor Raymond Adams' department. The subjects were 14 women and 6 men with well-established alcoholic Korsakoff states: there was a control series of 23 alcoholic and neurological patients. The subjects were asked to learn words -15 nonsense syllables and 20 real wordsprinted on cards and shown to them for three minutes each: they were then asked to recall as many of the words as they could. Then they were either given the same list to relearn or they were given a matched series of words and the procedure repeated for this list, after which they were tested with the first list again, to see whether the second learning task had interfered with the first. A similar procedure was followed in tests of recognition. The control group showed an increase in the number of syllables or words correctly recalled when they had had to relearn the same list, but this gain was reduced when a second, matched list had been interposed and the subject required to memorize it: in other words, in the control subjects there was clear evidence of retroactive inhibition. But the Korsakoff patients showed no gain in relearning, and no retroactive interference effects, whether tested by reproduction or recognition. It can be concluded that in Korsakoff patients who have a residual though poor, capacity for learning and retention, there is no evidence to suggest that their forgetting can be attributed to retroactive inhibition. Whether the converse phenomenon of reminiscenceimproved recall after an interval of restoccurs in Korsakoff patients has not, as far as I know, been investigated.
Another approach to the problem of forgetting has been by relating it to extinction (Woodworth & Schlosberg 1954) . There are conspicuous differences between the two processes, of course, but there are also similarities, notable in the way that an extinguished conditioned response can be spontaneously recovered after an interval. Without entering into a controversial field, it is worth recalling that in eyelid response conditioning to a buzzer, with a puff of air as the unconditioned stimulus, Korsakoff patients have shown abnormally rapid extinction; they also, as one would expect, were much less able to form conditional responses in the first place. This was demonstrated in the study made by Horsley Gantt & Muncie (1942) of a series of Korsakoff patients. The unconditioned stimulus was a painful faradic shock, the conditioned stimulus a light or sound. The experiments confirmed the importance of 'set', especially when reinforced by the patient's verbal formulation of what is happening, and they showed that a Korsakoff patient's ability to form conditioned responses is roughly proportionate to the severity of his clinical condition.
Distinctiveness of the Syndrome
In any survey of the problems of the amnesic syndrome, it is paradoxically evident that, remarkable and characteristic as are the clinical anomalies in this conditionthe contrast, for instance, between the patients' retained verbal facility and his profound disturbance of memoryyet systematic examination of his memory reveals only quantitative differences between him and a healthy person of the same age. The extent of the quantitative differences can indeed be enormous, but still it is possible to detect in normal people the same essential phenomena occurring sporadically: we all have unexpected and unexplained lapses of memory, we all develop paramnesias, we all confabulate and have occasional disturbances in our time-attribution and sequence; even retrograde amnesia can be observed in healthy people after a severe emotional unheaval. The cognate similarity in quality, in spite of coarse and obtrusive differences in pattern and corrigibility, may be found between hysterical amnesia and some features of the organic amnesic syndrome. I do not mean to say anything so absurd as that a patient with hysterical amnesia exhibits the typical phenomena of a Korsakoff patient, but I suggest that there is nothing in the known psychopathology of hysterical amnesia which has not been observed in the organic cerebral syndrome. A dramatic instance was supplied by my patient (Lewis 1953) with partly arrested G.P.I. and a severe amnesic syndrome, periodically aggravated. He had developed, while in the United States, such apparently psychoge-nic dissociation that his amnesia was wholly attributed to this by an experienced observer, an authority on the psychological effects of brain damage, who wrote a book.about this patient's symptoms and psychopathology; they were there interpreted as wholly hysterical (Franz 1933 ).
If we concede these points of close similarity between the psychopathology of the organic amnesic syndrome and that of the hystericaldissociative dysmnesia, as well as between these and the psychology of normal forgetting, we will want to examine what is known, or theorized, about the substrate of the amnesic syndrome and of normal remembering and forgetting. It would be in the hope, not that precise correspondence would emerge, but that a terra firma would be established on which the data of behaviour and process could be securely placed. A psychopathology that does not take full account of related physiological and pathological neural phenomena is riskily unmoored and unballasted. But there is also a notorious danger in trying to pass from psychological to physiological and anatomical data. Lashley said that 'we seem little nearer to an understanding of the nature of memory trace than was Descartes'. It is startling, after that, to turn to what Descartes actually wrote about his understanding of the nature of the memory trace: 'When the soul wills to recall something, this volition, by causing the pineal gland to bend successively now to one side and now to another, impels the spirit towards this and that region of the brain, until they come upon the part where the traces left by the object we will to recall are found. These traces consist in the manner in which the animal spirits, owing to the paths they have taken on. the presence of that object, have so modified the pores of the brain that these have acquired a greater facility than the others of being opened in that same fashion when the spirits again come towards them'. If in truth we are little nearer than Descartes was to understanding the nature of memory trace, we had better be rather cautious in our conjectures about what has happened in the brain to make memory traces as scanty and inaccessible as they are in the amnesic syndrome.
Cerebral Substrate
There is now a consensus of opinion that in the Korsakoff syndrome, as in Wernicke's encephalopathy, degenerative changes are regularly and primarily found in the pericentricular and periaqueductal grey matter, the corpora mamillaria, the dorsal medial nucleus of the thalamus and to some extent in the brain-stem and cerebellum. Essential connexions between these areas, the cornu ammonis and the cingulate cortex, have been postulated and given functional significance, on thelines which Papez(1937) and, more recently, MacLean (1958) and others have emphasized. But the discrepancies between the results of ablation in human beings and animals, and the diverse functions which these systems are believed to subservemotivation, emotion, memory, execution of complex sequences of actionimpose caution. It seems premature to assume that because the corpora mamillaria and other rhinencephalic structures show degenerative changes in the Korsakoff state, we can therefore assign to these cell-aggregates and their connexions a direct responsibility for serving the functions ofmemory. Brierley (1961) in his recent review of the correspondence between neuropathological findings and defect of recent memory, concluded that there are two groups of cells, not necessarily acting in unison, which are essential for rememberingthe cortical group in the hippocampi and a hypothalamic group in the mamillary bodies: and he drew attention, as others have, to the extensive pathways entering and leaving these areas and linking them to the fornix. What features of the memory function depend on the integrity of either of these areas and projections it is scarcely possible to say. Penfield (1958) is sometimes invoked in support of the view that retention and recall are located in the mesial temporal cortex. His observations are very well known but it is only fair to remark that he disavows knowing how and where the recording of memory impressions takes place: he goes no further than to say that somewhere in the brain there is a 'pathway of synaptic and ganglionic facilitations which linger on after a present experience has faded into the past' leaving a record of experience which has been activated in certain of his patients by rhythmic electrical impulses delivered to the superior and lateral surfaces of the temporal cortex: he suspects that the 'ganglionic patterns of experience' are in the hippocampi. That is probably as far as anyone might go in localizing memory, at present.
I have referred to these anatomical and physiological aspects of memory only because psychopathology, however boldly independent, has to modify its formulations whenever some clear correspondence is established between physical events and psychological events. But such clear correspondence has not yet been demonstrated and the seeker after truth is confronted by a rapidly changing array of concepts borrowed from informationtheory and biology. There are curious and ironical similarities between some of the recent attempts to interpret the memory process in terms of synaptic facilitation (Burns 1958 ) and the speculations of Freud in 1895 on the same subject. Freud postulated two sorts of neurons -'permeable' neurons, which subserve perception, and 'impermeable' neurons, i.e. neurons in which excitation does not pass readily across the 'contact-barriers' and which subserve memory. The latter neurons are permanently affected by an excitation, so that facilitation occurs, making their 'contact-barriers' more permeable to the spread of such excitation (Freud 1954) . Interesting and ingenious as was Freud's. development of this neurologizing theory, I shall not quote it further; it serves, however, as a reminder of the perennial fascination of conjectures about the substrate of normal and disturbed memory.
Hysterical Amnesia It would seem odd for a psychiatrist to finish even a very brief talk about amnesia without a further word on hysteria. Hysterical amnesia can be such a spectacular affair, and the instances of 'multiple personality' due to it are so arrestingwhen well toldthat it gets more attention than its frequency warrants. Out of 1,259 patients admitted between April 1959 and March 1960 to a hospital receiving psychiatric emergencies in London, 58 had the organic-amnesic syndrome, but there were only 2 patients admitted during the year because of hysterical amnesia for the details of their personal identity and experience. During the last five years only 12 such patients were admitted to the hospital in question. Gross hysterical amnesia is in fact rather a rare condition. But there is a stronger reason than rarity for dealing with it summarily in a discussion of amnesic syndromes: it hardly belongs there. It is in a sense misleading to call it amnesia, for in these people, as Henri Ey (1950) has rightly said, we are dealing not with a circumscribed disorder of memory, but with a disturbance of synthesis which engages the whole personality. The War provided crude examples of the phenomenon, less spectacular than the dramatic cases reported in the last century and again lately, but clearly demonstrating that a personality-reaction rather than an isolated amnesia was here evident. The treatment was correspondingly distinct in its aims and effect. It is true that in the organic-amnesic syndrome the characteristic disorder of memory is associated with other anomalies of mental function; it is not really an isolated amnesia and nothing more. But there is, as Korsakoff so strongly emphasized, a startling contrast between the severity of the memory deficit in this condition and the excellence of other cognitive functions, especially those concerned with the use of words. The contrasts which obtrude in the mental state of hysterical dissociation are of another order and they can be abolished.
I am sorry that this brief review is inconclusive. Experimental psychology, neurophysiology, psychiatry, neurology and neurosurgery have all been depositing offerings, large and small, towards the solution of the fascinating, perplexing problems of psychopathology which the amnesic syndrome 961 presents. But these contributions are still far removed from synthesis or certainty. There is enough stir and movement around the subject to make a propitious turmoil: not so lively a turmoil perhaps as Freud once made with his exploration of the arcana of forgetting, but stimulating and suggestive enough to promise real advances.
Dr R S Allison (Belfast)
Chronic Amnesic Syndromes in the Elderly'
The type of memory loss which I shall discuss is that which occurs in elderly people as the consequence of organic brain disease. In the past fifteen years more than 200 cases have been seen in the neurological department at Belfast. In most of them impairment of memory was overshadowed by other signs of disease, such as hemiplegia and disturbances of speech and language, but in 45 it was the chief, if not the only, complaint. Among these patients there were 26 men and 19 women and the average age when they were first seen was 58 years; the youngest was 37 and the eldest 69 years. Patients were studied clinically, electroencephalographicallyandbycontrastradiography, as required. A firm diagnosis was reached in only 30 or 66% (Table 1) . Those in whom the cause remained in doubt were classified as 'presenile dementia'; this included patients in whom family history was negative, there were no focal neurological signs or evidence of cerebral atherosclerosis and in whom the appearances on lumbar encephalography were indicative of diffuse, symmetrical cortical atrophy. Of the 30 others in whom a firm diagnosis was made, 6 had intracranial tumours, 4 of these being meningiomata. Cushing & Eisenhardt (1938) noted disturbances of memory in some of their cases, especially frontally-placed tumours, but in discussing convexity meningiomas they remarked that mental symptoms were notable by their absence. Sachs (1950) , however, described 8 cases of meningioma, some frontal, some parietal, 'Modified from an original paper read before the Harveian Society of London. others temporal, in all of which the earliest symptoms were those of dementia. Headache was a prominent symptom in only 1 of our 4 cases of meningioma. In none was there a history of epileptiform fits and in only one was papillcedema observed. Neurological signs indicative of a focal lesion, however, could be elicited in all but one case, although they were minimal-and could easily have been overlooked. Lesions involving the third ventricle are known to be associated with pronounced impairment of memory (Gamper 1928 , Williams & Pennybacker 1954 , Conrad & t1le 1951 . The patient with a third ventricle cyst had a Korsakoff psychosis, and more general absentmindedness and drowsiness were prominent in the case of pinealoma.
Cerebral atherosclerosis accounted for 6 cases. The possibility that carotico-vertebral atheroma might lead to the development of a chronic amnesic syndrome was not considered until recent years and it is conceivable, therefore, that symptoms in some patients classified as presenile dementia may have been due to this cause. Hurwitz et al. (1959) have reported a case in which the mental state was most suggestive of Korsakoff's psychosis.
Anoxia was responsible for a further 6 cases, in 2 symptoms being the result of temporary cardiac arrest and in 1 of defective aeration, all 3 accidents occurring during the course of surgical operations. In another case there had been severe hmmatemesis and the 2 remaining ones were due to accidental asphyxia from carbon monoxide and electrocution respectively.
Clinical Features of Chronic Amnesic Syndromes
In considering the clinical features shown by these patients, especially in their early stage of development, the hypothesis has been adopted that their intellectual decline follows the same pattern as that seen in previously healthy subjects recovering consciousness from the post-traumatic and anoxic encephalopathies, where in certain instances the recovery of 'full' consciousness, in the sense that Symonds (1937) used the term, may be delayed for several days, weeks or months. In these states it is possible to trace different phases through which the victims pass before full consciousness is regained (Table 2 ). In the chronic amnesic patients the same symptoms were observed except, of course, that their order was reversed, impairment of memory, perseveration, difficulty in registration and alterations in mood being the first to attract attention.
Memory loss was often difficult to evaluate because so many denied that it was of any consequence and others, whilst admitting it, excused themselves on one ground or another. These evasions were more oiten encountered in patients with diffuse cortical atrophy than they were with focal lesions, and especially with tumours the duration of memory impairment was shorter and its onset more easy to define. Enquiry among relatives brought out this point very clearly. In patients becoming demented it was often impossible to say when memory defects had first been noticed; they had clearly been present for a long time. Memory testing was conducted by drawing up, with the aid of a relative, a series of questions on past events in the patient's life, which he might reasonably be expected to remember, allowance being made for his social and educational level.
In only 5 patients was impairment of memory strictly confined to recent events. and 2 of these had frontally placed meningiomas. In all the others memory loss affected distant and recent events. Memories for recent events, however, were most affected. Thus, one man who had recently returned from the United States, where he had lived for some years, could recall the name of the ship (Leviathan) and other details of his outward journey in 1924 but had no recollection of his return passage, which had been made only a few weeks before he was examined. Good preservation of memory for distant events was sometimes seen in non-progressive post-traumatic and anoxic patients, about whom the relatives frequently commented that they seemed 'to dwell in the past' and take little or no interest in current events.
Character ofMemory Defects
The character of the memory loss was not easy to analyse because in most cases multiple defects were found and it was often difficult to say which was of most significance. In general, however, four chief types of defect occurred:
(1) Inability to recall names: When pronounced, this was usually associated with loss of spontaneous talk, the patient remaining silent unless spoken to. The difficulty in word finding lay chiefly with nouns and proper names. Although unable to recall these from memory, amnesic patients were surprisingly good at naming sighted objects, the act of seeing or touching an object clearly helping to stimulate recall of its name. This is a point of distinction from dysphasic patients with focal lesions involving the speech area who usually find as much difficulty in naming sighted objects as they do in naming from memory. Other differences in this respect between focal and diffuse lesions are that chronic amnesics use periphrasis and gesture to a lesser extent and that they are not so prone to develop catastrophic reactions as patients with purely focal lesions, when they fail to get the word they want (Allison 1955) .
As to the nature of this naming difficulty, perseveration sometimes played a part, this being shown by their ability to give a name correctly but when asked for a second name to boggle over it and keep on repeating the first name. But in the majority the defect was amnesic in origin. That is to say, if one were to give them a word they could repeat it without difficulty, although a moment or two later they had forgotten what it was.
Non-verbal tests were used to ascertain the capacity for registration in these cases: a number of objects was displayed and then, whilst the patient looked on, they were concealed in separate hiding places. Thus, when a patient watched a comb being hidden under his pillow, a key being placed in the drawer of his bedside locker and a spoon slipped under the counterpane of his bed, he appeared to be registering, but proof of his having done so was only forthcoming when, on being invited to show where they were, he was able to do so correctly. We have been in the habit of giving this test to aphasics with focal lesions as well as to chronic amnesic patients and the results show that those with focal lesions usually have no difficulty, pointing to the place of concealment of objects without hesitation, whereas patients with diffuse cortical atrophy are often unable to do so.
(2) Temporal amnesic defects, or inability to arrange previous events in their correct sequence were less obvious than naming defects but could be discerned in a number of cases, in some of which they seemed to be the chief disability. One instance was a woman aged 65, a university graduate, who for years before she became ill had been a private governess. So perfect was her poise at the first interview that it was difficult to believe there could be anything seriously amiss. However, she readily admitted her difficulty in remembering and submitted willingly to tests. There was no trace of perseveration, series could be repeated forwards and backwards with ease. When asked to name some flowers she rattled off: 'wallflower, chrysanthemum, dog daisy, marguerite, hairbell, hyacinth, primrose, violet', and it was the same with anything else one asked her. Sighted objects were also named instantly. The only defects lay in her great difficulty in registration, her inability to see the point of simple pictures and in an absolute constructional apraxia. Her temporal defects in memory are illustrated by the following excerpt from a conversation in 1953: More severe defects in this aspect of memory may account for the peculiar behaviour of some amnesic patients who do not know when it is time to stop work or when to begin it. One man, before admission to hospital, had been upsetting the household by rising in the early hours of the morning, dressing himself and going to the office where he arrived by six o'clock. Another, who lived in the country, first drew attention to his conditionhe had a right frontal meningiomaby setting out for town one day to transact business, and only realizing on his arrival that it was a Sunday.
(3) Loss of topographic memory or inability to remember the spatial relationships of previously well-known places was a pronounced feature in 13 patients, all of whom turned out to have diffuse cortical atrophy, this kind of memory defect, as it happened, not being observed in any of the cases with space-occupying lesions. The tendency to get lost out of doors and be found wandering was typical. Most of these patients had difficulty even at home in remembering the situation of different rooms and often could not recall upon which side of the street they lived or in which direction lay the shops, church or cinema. One patient with Alzheimer's disease was so absent-minded that after being shown one evening to his room he got into bed the wrong way round and was discovered later with his feet on the pillow and his head at the foot of the bed.
As regards loss of sense of direction; a few patients had a vague recollection of the street they were in looking unfamiliar and it is possible that this jamais vue effect may have heralded a minor fit, the amnesia following which was responsible for their becoming lost. In others, however, in whom there was no evidence of epilepsy, the illusion of unfamiliarity may have been related to perseveration or inability to reorientate themselves to a fresh scene, owing to persistence of the former scene. That is to say, their loss of sense of direction may have coincided with stopping to gaze in a window or enter a shop so that when they turned around or came out their minds were so preoccupied with what they had seen that they did not know which direction to take. One man, in whom this was a prominent symptom, said that when in doubt he invariably turned to the left but investigation showed that this behaviour was not prompted by his being left-handed or by the presence of a right-sided hemianopia or visual inattention.
As regards other intellectual defects shown by these patients all had difficulty in registration and over half displayed perseveration. Ideomotor apraxia (especially difficulty in dressing) was observed in 6 and visual object agnosia in 3. Unfortunately, tests for constructional apraxia were not done in all cases, but, when they were, gross defects in this sphere were always found. Their state of orientation varied; apart from disorientation in time, which is often of little significance in hospital patients, 6 were disorientated in place, 1 for persons and 5 had difficulty in distinguishing their left hand from their right and in identifying their fingers. All those given house-drawing tests showed inability to attain correct perspective.
In none of these cases was a visual half-field defect or unilateral visual inattention demonstrable. Patients with focal parieto-occipital lesions often show these signs and have difficulty not only in selecting particular objects from among a number of other objects but in deciding which of two objects is the nearer or the further away. Many patients with diffuse cortical atrophy and topographic memory loss were tested for their inability to determine the 'nearness' and 'farness' of objects placed in their view but they wereusually able to do so without difficulty. This was an unexpected result because it was thought that if a focal lesion were liable to disturb particular aspects of spatial orientation, a global cerebral affection might lead to total disruption of the function. However, a possible explanation may lie in the parallel which can be drawn between the performance of demented patients with pronounced topographic memory loss and those with marked naming difficulties, who are helped in overcoming their defect by being shown the objects they are required to name. Their difficulty is chiefly in recalling names from memory. Similarly with topographic memory loss: the more concrete the task set the patient the less apparent are his spatial difficulties. (4) Failure to employ memory as a 'tool'. 'Amnesic indifference': This type of memory defect was perhaps the most common. In these patients memory loss was more apparent than real and the difficulty seemed to lie in their inability, in the absence of an appropriate stimulus, to bring retained facts back to mind. Kahn & Thompson (1934) were probably the first to refer to it when they spoke of patients having lost the ability to employ memory as a 'working tool'. At that time it was thought to be typical of presenile dementia but later French authors such as Ajuriaguerra & Rouault de la Vigne (1946) noted it in post-anoxic cases, referring to it as 'une sorte d'indifference mnesique' and Williams & Pennybacker (1954) have correlated 'not bothering' to remember with lesions of the frontal cortex.
These patients usually displayed a mood of unconcern or nonchalance, often wearing a faintly amused or tolerant expression and confabulating freely to conceal their difficulties. There was little failure in retention, the fault lying chiefly in defective registration and recall so that the overall clinical picture resembled that of the Korsakoff syndrome. There was usually difficulty in reversing series but perseveration and catastrophic reactions were uncommon. Thus, one woman when visited was invariably found reading, her husband supplying her with a selection of novels each week in the belief that they helped her 'to while away the time in hospital'. They certainly had this effect, but although willing and able to recite portions aloud, a moment later she was quite unable to recall what she had read, excusing herself by saying that it was not her type of book or that the characters in it were too dull to make recall worth while. Another typical feature of testing memory in these cases was that, when prompted, they were often able to supply other related facts gratuitously. The following is an example: The patient, a well-educated woman of 61, had a tumour (pinealoma) invading the third ventricle. The conversation related to her childhood, between the years 1892 and 1907: Q. ' There is some similarity here to the familiar business of priming a hand pump. One may first have to pour a little fluid down the barrel to get the water to flow. So, in seeking information from these patients it is necessary to supply some particular fact before other related facts can be recalled.
Deductions drawn from purely clinical observations may tend to oversimplify a problem, but whatever may be the physiologica.l mechanisms involved, the clinical features of the chronic amnesic syndrome (or of presenile dementia, using the term in its broadest sense) appear capable of interpretation in at least two ways.
First, there is the classical concept of the cortex acting as a storehouse, memory loss being due to its disintegration as a source of reference and comparable in this sense to a library the shelves of which have been depleted of books. Many of the clinical features of aphasia in patients with focal lesions can be so explained, and the same may be true of other specialized forms of intellectual activity. Loss ofmemory in diffuse cortical atrophy has also been ascribed to it, but as has been seen in the cases described failure in retention is not always demonstrable. Indeed, in many cases, clinical observation suggests that it is registration and not retention that is primarily at fault. Although such patients may have the greatest possible difficulty in registering some fresh piece of information, once they have done so they display a curious knack of retaining it so that they may surprise the examiner months later, and long after he himself has forgotten it, by their ability to repeat it verbatim.
Second, there is the possibility that memory loss in these cases may be due to breakdown of the referral mechanism occurring at an early stage, when the cortex is still relatively intact. In favour of this is the effect of priming in stimulating recall and the frequency with which moods of unconcern or indifference are encountered in such patients.
Psychologists recognize that difficulty in recall implies some sort of interference or competition and that in health this most commonly results from emotional causes. However, one hesitates to relate amnesic indifference to the changed affect that is often seen or to accept the view that moods of unconcern are due to possible leucotomizing effects of the underlying lesions. These patients vary too much in their behaviour and performances from day to daydepending on what they are doingto make this proposition readily acceptable, nor will it account for the rapidity with which amnesic indifference disappears after the successful removal of a tumour or subdural hiematoma. It seems more probable that this common type of memory impairment may be due to disturbance of the physiological nlPrting mpehanism in the hrain-stem iand di-encephalon to which, so far as I am aware, little attention has yet been paid in the presenile dementias. Penfield believes that this centrencephalic system, as he has named it, corresponds to Hughlings Jackson's highest level of functional integration, but whether this is so or not, there is reason to relate amnesic indifference to faults in these circuits, which, as we know, are symmetrically connected with widespread areas in both cerebral cortices. Dr William Gooddy (London) read a paper entitled Some Observations on Retrograde Amnesia Joint Meeting May 4-61961 with the SociettA Italiana di Neurologia at the Royal Society ofMedicine and at the National Hospitalfor Nervous Diseases, Queen Square, London
The following papers were read: 
